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In March 1995, Canadian gunboats seized and impounded a
Spanish fishing trawler and cut the nets of another Spanish boat for
alleged violations of international quotas and regulations governing
the fishing of Greenland Halibut in the international waters of the
North Atlantic.1 Spain and the European Union (EU) responded by
alleging that the Canadians violated international law and committed
an act of piracy by seizing a foreign ship in international waters.2 The
EU threatened to impose economic sanctions against Canada, and the
Spanish government responded by sending its own gunboats into the
* 1997 J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law.
1 Fisheries: Canada Slashes Net of Spanish Trawler, GREENwm, Mar. 27, 1995; Colin Nick-
erson, Fish Spawning Ill Will at Sea; Dwindling Stocks Are Straining International Relations, Bos-
TON GLOBE, Mar. 26, 1995. See also Clyde H. Farnsworth, When They Talk About Fish, the
Mellow Canadians Bellow, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1995, at 11.
The Greenland Halibut is used mainly to manufacture processed fish products. It is largely
considered unappetizing in Spain, and almost the entire Spanish catch of Greenland Halibut is
exported to Japan. See John Damton, Spanish Stirred by 'War' Over a Fish They Don't Eat,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1995 at 3.
2 See Juan Antonio Yanez-Barneuvo, Canada Flouts Sea Law in Fish Dispute, N.Y. TIMES,




North Atlantic.3 The stage was set for a classic shoot-out on the high
seas.
This comment analyzes the Canada-EU dispute in light of current
fisheries law as embodied in the 1982 United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III).' More specifically, it examines
how the Canada-EU dispute highlights some major deficiencies in the
existing system of international fisheries law regulating straddling and
highly migratory fish stocks.5 In addition, this comment discusses the
most recent attempt aimed at reforming international fishery law and
preventing future international disputes concerning straddling and mi-
gratory fish stocks: the August 1995 United Nations Agreement on
Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (Fish Stocks Agree-
ment).6  This comment argues that, although the Fish Stocks Agree-
ment is an important step in the creation of a solid legal framework to
regulate straddling and migratory fish stocks, it contains several ambi-
guities which may hamper its ability to address current deficiencies in
fisheries law which contributed to the 1995 Canada-EU dispute.
Part II of this comment gives a brief history of the development
of international fisheries law. Part III analyzes the Canada-EU dis-
pute in light of current international fisheries law and shows how the
dispute highlights some of the main deficiencies of UNCLOS III in
dealing with straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. Part IV pro-
vides a brief overview of the August 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks
Agreement. Part V evaluates how the Fish Stocks Agreement ad-
dresses some of the main deficiencies in international fisheries law
3 See John Darnton, Two Feuding Nations With Fish Stories, N.Y. TrMas, Apr. 2, 1995, at 4;
Spain, Canada Head for New Clashes in Fish War, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Apr. 15,1995; Tom
Buerkle, Fishing Pact Ends Dispute Between EU and Canada, INT'L HERALD Tam., Apr. 17,
1995.
4 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, with Annexes, Dec. 10, 1982, and
the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea, with Annexes, opened for signature July 28, 1994, art. 55, S. TREATY Doc.
No. 103-39 (1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS III].
5 Straddling fish stocks are fish stocks which tend to "straddle" jurisdictional lines, and
highly migratory fish stocks are fish stocks which tend to move between various jurisdictions.
See generally William Emerson, Hitting the High Seas, OROANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPER-
ATON AND OECD OBSERVER, Aug. 1995, at 33. See also Cyril De Klemm, Migratory Species in
International Law, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 935, 935-37 (1989) (discussing the status of various
types of migratory species in international law).
6 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of
Straddling Fish Stock and Highly Migratory Fish Stock, Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 6th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF 164/37 (1995), 34 I.L.M. 1542
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which contributed to the 1995 Canada-EU dispute. Finally, Part VI
offers some concluding remarks.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Between the 17th and the late 19th centuries, two principles came
to dominate the customary international law of the sea: the principle
of mare liberum (open sea) and the principle of the territorial sea.7
Mare liberum, developed by the Dutch philosopher Hugo de Groot
(Grotius) in the early 17th century, was rooted in the idea that the
oceans were the common property of all.8 Because the oceans were
the common property of all humankind, mare liberum dictated not
only that no one nation or individual could possess private property
rights over the oceans, but also that the oceans should be free and
accessible to all.' Gradually, mare liberum gained acceptance and be-
came one of the dominant principles of the international law of the
sea.'" As part of the doctrine of mare liberum, the freedom of fishing
on the high seas became an entrenched element of the international
law of the sea." This meant that no state had a right to prohibit or
regulate the fishing activities of foreign vessels on the high seas.' 2
Both the principle of freedom of fishing on the high seas and mare
liberum were premised on the idea that ocean resources and the op-
7 See JAMES C.F. WANG, HANDBOOK ON OCEAN POLITICS AND LAw 43-44 (1992).
8 JAMES B. MORELi THE LAW OF THE SEA: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 1982
TREATY AND ITS REJECrION BY THE UNITED STATES 2 (1992). In 1609, Grotius published a
pamphlet entitled Mare Liberum which outlined his principle and argued for the freedom of the
seas. See generally R. P. ANAND, ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 77-89
(1982).
9 See MORELL, supra note 8, at 2. According to Grotius, "[t]he sea can in no way become
the private property of any one, because nature not only allows but enjoins its common use....
Nature does not give a right to anybody to appropriate such things as may inoffensively be used
by everybody and are inexhaustible, and therefore, sufficient for all." Quoted in id.
'0 In the 17th century, mare liberum (open sea) gradually prevailed over the rival concept of
mare clausum (closed sea). Mare clausum extended state sovereignty from land to sea and al-
lowed states to claim jurisdiction and control over vast areas of the world's oceans. With the
discovery of the Americas in the 15th century, Spain and Portugal became the dominant naval
powers and, relying on their naval might and the doctrine of mare clausum, proceeded to seize
control of vast stretches of the world's oceans in order to better exploit the resources of the New
World. In order to break the Spanish and Portuguese monopoly over the oceans, developing
naval powers such as the British and the Dutch developed and championed mare liberum. With
the arrival of the Dutch and British as the new dominant naval powers in the early 17th century,
mare liberum gradually became the dominant tenet of the law of the sea and remained so for the
next 300 years. See WANG, supra note 7, at 41-43. See also ANAND, supra note 8, at 72-116, 124-
35.
11 See Jon L. Jacobson, Law of the Sea: International Fisheries Law in the Year 2010,45 LA. L.
REv. 1161, 1170 (1985); ANAND, supra note 8, at 151.




portunities to exploit them were inexhaustible. 13 As long as there was
enough for all, there was no reason to limit access to the oceans'
bounty.
At the same time, international law recognized the principle of
the territorial sea. The principle of the territorial sea allowed a
coastal state to claim exclusive possession and control over a narrow
belt of the sea (usually three to four nautical miles) adjacent to the
coastal state's land area.'4 Until the middle of the 20th century, the
concept of the territorial sea - that narrow belt of the sea over which
coastal states exercised sovereignity - and the principle of freedom
of the high seas - that vast area of the oceans beyond national juris-
dictions - remained the two cornerstones of the customary interna-
tional law of the sea. 15
The law of the sea, including international fisheries law, under-
went crucial changes in the post-World War II period. While growing
world populations increased the demand for ocean resources, new
technologies permitted the exploration of the ocean bottom for such
resources as gas and oil and allowed long-term fishing on the high seas
which made possible the capture of entire stocks of fisheries.'6 In-
creased demands for the world's sea resources, combined with highly
efficient modern fishing methods, led to overfishing and the depletion
of the world's fisheries. 17 As a result, the Grotian view that ocean
resources were inexhaustible was challenged and superseded by the
realization that the oceans' resources were scarce and that conserva-
tion measures were necessary to prevent their total depletion.' In
addition, the development of ocean technologies such as supertankers
13 See VANG,, supra note 7, at 44. This view is also reflected in the arguments used by Gro-
tils in support of mare liberum. As Grotius argued, the seas should remain open for everybody
because "[n]ature does not give a right to anybody to appropriate such things as may inoffen-
sively be used by everybody and are inexhaustible, and therefore sufficient for all." Quoted in
MORELL, supra note 8, at 2.
14 See MoRELL, supra note 8, at 2. According to Morell, the limited acceptance of mare
clausum reflected the limited nature of the territorial sea concept. Id.
In 1703, another Dutchman, Bynkershoek, fixed the distance of the territorial sea as the
distance a cannon shot travels when fired from shore, and by the beginning of the 19th century
many states considered the extent of their territorial seas to reach three miles from their respec-
tive shores. See ANAN, supra note 8, at 138-39.
15 WANG, supra note 7, at 43-44.
16 Id. at 44-45. See also ANAND, supra note 8, at 162-63.
17 According to the Food and Agriculture Organization, in the early 1990s almost 70% of the
world's harvested species were depleted, overexploited to the brink of their capacity to
reproduce, or just recovering after a period of depletion. See Emerson, supra note 5, at 34.
18 WANG, supra note 7, at 44.
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gave rise to concerns for environmental safety in case of oil spills.19
All of these developments required a re-evaluation of the old princi-
ples of the law of the sea and the creation of new legal regimes to deal
with emerging political, economic, and environmental problems.2 °
After World War II, the primary feature in the development of
fisheries law has been the extension of national jurisdiction into what
had been considered the high seas - areas beyond national jurisdic-
tion which were previously free and accessible to all.21 Coastal na-
tions favored an extension of their jurisdictions into the high seas in
order to gain control of valuable fishing and mineral resources.' In
addition, the development of modern and sophisticated distant-water
fishing fleets - fishing vessels capable of fishing on the high seas for
extended periods of time - by nations such as Japan, the former So-
viet Union, and the United States stimulated the movement for the
extension of national sovereignty into the high seas.3 Faced with
growing scarcity of fishery resources, local fishermen and their gov-
ernments resented both the presence of these distant-water fleets in
"their" seas and the taking of "their" fish. 4  However, under the
traditional principle of the freedom of fishing on the high seas, the
coastal states could not generally regulate these foreign distant-water
fleets because they would fish outside the coastal states' limited terri-
torial seas.'
19 Id. at 44-45.
20 The emergence of this new international law of the sea in the post-World War II period
was heavily influenced by newly independent Asian and African states. With the collapse of
colonialism after World War II, newly independent African and Asian states for the first time
began to play an important role in the formulation of international law of the sea through con-
certed action in such international bodies as the United Nations. See ANAND, supra, note 8, at
161-62. See also M. Johanne Picard, International Law of Fisheries and Small Developing States:
A Call for the Recognition of Regional Hegemony, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J. 318,320-22 (1996) (outlin-
ing the role played by newly independent states in the formulation of international law of the sea
after World War II).
21 This does not mean that states did not try to extend their jurisdictions into the high seas
before World War II. In fact, several states unilaterally declared extensions of their territorial
seas beyond the traditionally accepted three mile limit well before World War II. See generally
ANAND, supra note 8, at 140 (pointing out that disagreement over the scope of the territorial sea
continued into the twentieth century "with countries adopting various limits as suited their inter-
ests or whims"). However, it was only after World War II that extension of state sovereignty
into the high seas became a prominent feature of international fisheries law. See generally Jacob-
son, supra note 11, at 1170-73.
22 See, e.g., M. DAHMANI, THE FISHERIEs REGIME OF THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE 14-
15 (1987) (stressing the desire of developing coastal states to get control of vital economic re-
sources through the EEZ concept).






Gradually, during the 1960s and 1970s various coastal states
claimed extended jurisdictions of up to 200 miles.26 The scope of
these claims varied substantially. Some states claimed extensions of
their territorial seas of up to 200 miles. Others claimed the creation of
various 200 mile zones aimed at controlling only particular fishery re-
sources. 7 Moreover, initially, the United States and the Soviet Union
opposed any extension of state jurisdiction into the high seas.28 Both
superpowers possessed large navies, and both feared that the creation
of these zones would interfere with the traditional high sea freedoms
of navigation and overflight.29 As a result, the superpowers sought to
control this movement through the development of comprehensive
agreements which would guarantee those traditional freedoms.3 0
Nevertheless, the movement toward the extension of state power onto
the high seas was inescapable. According to Professor Jacobson: "The
best parts of the ocean were being progressively gobbled up by na-
tional jurisdiction. The planet's great international commons was in
danger of division into national lakes.'
A watershed event occurred in 1976 when the United States de-
clared its own 200 mile zone of jurisdiction.32 Once the United
States, the greatest maritime power, adopted its own 200 mile zone,
the concept of the zone became widely accepted and utilized through-
out the international community. In fact, the endorsement of the 200
26 /d& at 1171-74. As early as 1952, Chile, Peru, and Ecuador adopted the Santiago Declara-
tion which asserted their moral and legal right to claim a 200 mile zone of maritime jurisdiction
for the purposes of protecting and regulating the use of natural resources within those areas. Id.
at 1171-72. See generally Ross D. ECKERT, THE ENCLOSURE OF OCEAN RESOURCES 128-29
(1979) (discussing early attempts at extending national jurisdiction into the high seas).
27 In the 1960s and 1970s, a large number of states extended the size of their territorial seas
up to 12 miles. Moreover, a great variety of claims extending between 12 and 200 miles and
encompassing various types of jurisdictions proliferated at this time. See Jacobson, supra note
11, at 1174.
28 Countries possessing deep-sea fishing fleets also opposed the creation of these 200 mile
zones. However, almost all states have coasts while relatively few states have long-range fishing
fleets. Consequently, the vast majority of coastal states had an interest in extending their juris-
dictions into the high seas in order gain control of valuable resources and had no interest in
preserving the traditional freedom to fish on the high seas which worked solely for the benefit of
the few states which possessed distant-water fishing fleets. kl at 1175.
29 See ANN L. HOLuCK, U.S. FOREIGN Poricy AND T=E LAW OF THE SEA 174-75 (1981).
30 Id.
31 Jacobson, supra note 11, at 1174.
32 See Proclamation No. 5030, 3 C.F.R. 22 (1985 Comp.). See generally Fisheries Conserva-
tion and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1802 (West 1985 & Supp. 1996).
Although the United States favored a comprehensive world-wide agreement which would regu-
late the establishment of these 200 mile zones, Congress and the executive branch eventually
gave in to pressure from the domestic fishing industry and declared the creation of a 200 mile
zone by the United States. See Jacobson, supra note 11, at 1176-77.
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mile exclusive economic zone in the 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) was largely a recognition of an
already existing customary principle of the international law of the
sea.
3 3
UNCLOS III is generally regarded as a codification of the basic
principles of both fisheries law and the law of the sea.A4 Under UN-
CLOS III, a coastal state may create a 200 mile EEZ in which it has
"sovereign" rights to exploit, explore, manage, and conserve both liv-
ing and non-living resources. 35 As part of the coastal state's "sover-
eign" rights, UNCLOS III allows the coastal state to enforce its laws
and regulations on foreign ships within its EEZ.36
33 See Jacobson, supra note 11, at 1177-78 (arguing that it was a "foregone conclusion" that
UNCLOS III would endorse the principle of a 200 mile exclusive economic zone).
The United States finally ratified UNCLOS III on October 7, 1994. See MORELL, supra note
8, at 96-148 (discussing reasons for U.S. delay in ratifying UNCLOS III).
34 See R.R. CHURCHILL AND A.V. Lowa, THE LAW OF TmE SEA 18-19 (1988) (arguing that
although there is no single text codifying all of the law of the sea, United Nations Conventions
on the Law of the Sea provide the basic framework); Suzanne Iudicello and Margaret Lytle,
Marine Biodiversity and International Law: Instruments and Institutions That Can Be Used To
Conserve Marine Biological Diversity Internationally, 8 TuL. ENvrL L. J. 123, 128 (1994) (argu-
ing that many experts believe that UNCLOS III functions as a codification of the law of the sea);
Julie R. Mack, Comment, International Fisheries Management" How the U.N. Conference on
Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Changes the Law of Fishing on the High Seas, 26
CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 313, 317 (1994) (arguing that UNCLOS III codified customary international
law).
UNCLOS III is the third attempt the by United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
to adopt a convention regulating the law of the sea. See generally ROBERT L. FxiEDRtm, NEGO-
TIATING THE NEw OCEAN REO]ME 27-40 (1993) (offering a "short history" of UNCLOS III).
The First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) was held in 1958 and
succeeded in adopting four conventions: the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contigu-
ous Zone, the Convention on the High Seas, the Convention on the Continental Shelf, and the
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas. See
CHURCHILL AND LOwn, supra at 13. The Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS II) was held in 1960 but failed to adopt any proposals regarding the extent of the
territorial sea or the scope of fisheries jurisdiction. See ANAND, supra note 8, at 189 (outlining
reasons for the failure of UNCLOS II to adopt any proposals on the extent of the territorial sea
or the scope of fisheries jurisdiction).
35 UNCLOS III, supra note 4, art. 56, at 115-16. Article 56 of UNCLOS III states in part:
"In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has: (a) sovereign rights for the purpose of
exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-
living, of the waters superjacent to the sea-bed and of the sea-bed and its subsoil, and with
regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the
production of energy from the water, currents and winds." Id.
Article 57 of UNCLOS III establishes the extent of the EEZ: "The exclusive economic zone
shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured." Id. at 116.
36 Id. art. 73, at 124. Article 73 allows the coastal state to "take such measures, including
boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure compliance




UNCLOS III also contains certain basic guidelines outlining how
states are expected to manage their respective EEZs.37 For example,
under Article 61, the state "shall" ensure that the living resources
within its EEZ are not overfished or overexploited. 38  Apart from
these general provisions, however, UNCLOS Ill gives each state a
great deal of discretion over how it chooses to manage and exploit the
fishery resources of its own EEZ. Moreover, given that 90% of all
fishery resources are found within 200 miles of the world's coasts,39
the EEZ concept essentially allows coastal states to manage and ex-
ploit the vast majority of the world's oceanic fishery resources.
In sum, modem fisheries law as embodied in UNCLOS III consti-
tutes a profound departure from the traditional principle of freedom
of fishing on the high seas. By recognizing the EEZ concept, modern
fisheries law has extended coastal state jurisdiction to the vast major-
ity of the world's fishery resources and to almost 40% of the world's
oceans.40  Although the freedom of fishing still exists on the high
seas,41 the development and proliferation of EEZs has greatly limited
the size of the high seas and has also defined the high seas as some of
the least biologically productive parts of the Earth's oceans.4 2
37 See id. arts. 60-75, at 117-25. For example, under Article 62 of UNCLOS III, "the coastal
State shall promote the objective of maximum utilization of the living resources in the exclusive
zone without prejudice to Article 61." Id. at 118. This means that a coastal state shall determine
the maximum allowable catch (the maximum amount of fish that can be safely caught without
overexploiting or depleting the resource) within its own EEZ. Moreover, if the coastal state
does not have the capacity to harvest the entire maximum allowable catch, it shall allow foreign
vessels, pursuant to regulations and quotas established by the coastal state, access to the surplus
of the allowable catch. ld. art. 62, at 118-19. See generally BARBARA KwrATKoWsKA, THE 200
MILE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE IN THE NEv LAW OF THE SEA 46-52 (1989) (discussing the
rights and duties of states under Articles 61 and 62 of UNCLOS III).
38 UNCLOS III art. 61(2), supra note 4, at 118. In addition, under Article 61, coastal states
must design measures "to maintain or restore populations of harvested species at levels which
can produce the maximum sustainable yields." Id. art. 61(3).
39 Ferdinand J. Gallo III, The Future of Fishery Management and Its Impact on the Seafood
Industry: A Comparison of United States and Canadian Fishery Management Policies After UN-
CLOS 111, 13 Nw. J. INr'. L. & Bus. 177, 178 (1992).
40 See Jacobson, supra note 11, at 1179; Mack, supra note 34, at 317.
41 See UNCLOS III art. 87, supra note 4, at 128-29. Article 87 enumerates the various free-
doms of the high seas. Id. Among others, all states have the freedoms of navigation, overflight
and fishing. Id. However, the freedom to fish on the high seas must be exercised with respect for
the rights of others. According to Article 87(2), the freedom of fishing "shall be exercised by all
States with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the
high seas, and also with due regard for the rights under this Convention with respect to activities
in the Area." Id. at 129.
42 For an explanation of why most of the world's fishery resources are found within a couple
hundred miles from land, see OuR CHANGING FisHERmrs 25-29 (Sidney Shapiro ed., 1971).
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Ill. THE CANADA-EU DIsPUTE AND THE CuRRENT LAW OF THE
SEA REGARDING STRADDLING AND MIGRATORY FISH
STOCKS
A. Straddling and Migratory Fish Stocks Under UNCLOS III
The nature of migratory or straddling fish stocks raises special
jurisdictional problems regarding which state is entitled to regulate
the stocks' use, to partake of the stocks' bounty, and to ensure the
stocks' preservation and optimal use. Because straddling fish stocks
"straddle" the lines between the high seas and the coastal states'
EEZs and because highly migratory stocks tend to move between var-
ious jurisdictional areas and the high seas, any conservation efforts
undertaken by a coastal state within its own EEZ can be undermined
by indiscriminate fishing in areas beyond the coastal state's jurisdic-
tion.43 Consequently, special rules are needed to promote the peace-
ful, economical, and ecologically sound harvesting of these ocean
resources.
UNCLOS III contains two articles dealing specifically with highly
migratory and straddling fish stocks.' Under UNCLOS III, coastal
states and other states fishing for migratory or straddling fishing
stocks must seek to agree, either directly or through regional fisheries
organizations, upon the measures necessary to ensure conservation
and to promote the optimum utilization of these fishery stocks. 45
Although UNCLOS III sets out certain general goals concerning
43 See Donald M. McRae, State Practice in Relation to Fisheries 84 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC.
283, 286 (1990) (arguing that the "benefits of effective management on the one side of a bound-
ary may be negated by the actions of the state on the other side"). See generally Mark Chris-
topherson, Note, Toward a Rational Harvest: The United Nations Agreement on Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Species, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 357, 364-66 (1996) (explaining that the
nature of straddling and migratory fish stocks has made them particularly susceptible to overfish-
ing); Donald M. Grzybroski et al., A Historical Perspective Leading Up to and Including The
United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 13 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 49, 50 (1995) (arguing that "[b]ecause fish do not observe international oceanic
boundaries during migrations, a problem arises as to who owns the fish").
44 UNCLOS III, supra note 4, arts. 63-64, at 119-20.
45 UNCLOS III Article 63(2) states: "Where the same stock or stocks of associated species
occur both within the exclusive economic zone and in an area beyond and adjacent to the zone,
the coastal State and the States fishing for such stocks in the adjacent area shall seek, either
directly or through appropriate subregional or regional organizations, to agree upon the meas-
ures necessary for the conservation of these stocks in the adjacent area." Id. at 119.
Article 64(1), pertaining to highly migratory species, contains similar language: "The coastal
State and other States whose nationals fish in the region for the highly migratory species listed in
Annex I shall cooperate directly or through appropriate international organizations with a view
to ensuring conservation and promoting the objective or optimum utilization of such species
throughout the region, both within and beyond the exclusive economic zone. In regions for




straddling and migratory fish stocks, it fails to provide any specific
directives detailing how states are to achieve these goals.46 In addi-
tion, although UNCLOS III contains provisions calling for binding
dispute settlement procedures which may apply to conflicts over strad-
dling or migratory fish stocks,47 the duty to "seek... to agree upon
measures necessary for the conservation" of straddling and migratory
fish stocks enshrined in UNCLOS III is probably too vague or too
political in nature for resolution through these judicial settlement
mechanisms.4' In effect, UNCLOS III leaves straddling and migra-
tory fishing stocks largely unregulated in the hope that interested par-
ties will devise their own regulatory schemes in conformance with the
goals set out in UNCLOS III.
B. The Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization
Both Canada and the European Community are members of the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO).49 The Northwest
nationals harvest these species in the region shall co-operate to establish such an organization
and participate in its work." Id. at 120.
UNCLOS III also contains provisions requiring states, based on the "best scientific evi-
dence," to take steps to protect and restore high seas fish stocks at levels that will produce
"maximum sustainable yield[s]." See id. art. 119(1), at 136.
46 Christopherson, supra note 43, at 367 (pointing out that UNCLOS III does not provide
any substantive rights in disputes between coastal states and nations fishing for endangered or
vulnerable high seas fish stocks); Grzybowksi, supra note 43, at 55 (asserting that UNCLOS III
fails to provide guidelines for cooperation and fails to indicate what happens if cooperation
fails); Mack, supra note 34, at 321-22 (arguing that UNCLOS III fails to provide a mechanism
allowing members of regional organizations to enforce regulations). See generally Emerson,
supra note 5, at 33 (arguing that UNCLOS III fails to spell out the means necessary to achieve its
goal of protecting high sea fishery resources from abuse); Shigeru Oda, Fisheries Under the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 739, 754 (1983) (arguing
that by merely suggesting cooperation among nations regarding the conservation of high sea
resources UNCLOS III has overlooked the basic problem of the allocation of these fishery re-
sources among states).
47 See UNCLOS III, supra note 4, arts. 286-87, at 197-98. Under Article 286, any signatory
party may request that a dispute regarding the interpretation or application of any provision of
UNCLOS III be submitted to a court or tribunal for settlement. Ld. at 197.
When signing or ratifying UNCLOS III, parties have the option to chose among several
dispute resolution mechanisms including the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and
the International Court of Justice. Id. art. 287, at 197. See also id. arts. 297-99, at 200-03 (outlin-
ing various limitations and exceptions to the dispute resolutions mechanisms).
48 See id. art. 63(2), at 119; Christopherson, supra note 43, at 367 (stating that general re-
quirements to cooperate under UNCLOS III are "arguably unenforceably vague"); Oda, supra
note 46, at 753-54 (arguing that disputes between states concerning the allocation of fishery
stocks on the high seas are political in nature and not suitable for resolution by judicial bodies).
49 The 1978 Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Convention established the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries Organization (NAFO) which came into existence in 1979. Since 1986, the European
Community has represented Spain in NAFO proceedings. As of October 1995, there were fif-
teen contracting parties to the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Convention: Bulgaria, Canada,
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Atlantic Fisheries Convention of 1978 established NAFO as a regional
fisheries organization whose object is to "contribute through consulta-
tion and cooperation to the optimum utilization, rational management
and conservation of the fishery resources of the Convention Area. 50
Although the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Convention applies to all
the waters of the Northwest Atlantic, NAFO's regulatory powers ex-
tend only to the Regulatory Area - that area of the Northwest At-
lantic over which coastal states have no jurisdiction. 51
NAFO has its own secretariat and consists of three principal or-
gans: the General Council, the Scientific Council, and the Fisheries
Commission. 2 The main functions of the General Council are to co-
ordinate and supervise the organizational, financial, and administra-
tive functions of NAFO. 53 The Scientific Council provides a forum for
consultatioh and cooperation among member states regarding issues
of scientific research in the Northwest Atlantic. More specifically, the
Scientific Council appraises, compiles, and exchanges information re-
lating to the fisheries of the Northwest Atlantic and provides advice
about management and conservation issues to the Fisheries Commis-
sion and to individual member states. 4
Cuba, Denmark, Estonia, European Economic Community, Iceland, Japan, Republic of Korea,
Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania, and the Russian Federation. See Notice of Other
Documents, 34 I.L.M. 1452 (1995).
50 Convention on Future Multilateral Co-operation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries,
opened for signature Oct. 24, 1978, art. II(1), Canada Treaty Series No. 11, 3-4 (1979) [hereinaf-
ter Convention]. Article I outlines NAFO's regulatory area, and the fishery resources covered
both by NAFO and by the Convention. See id. art. I, at 3.
51 Id. art. I. Article I(1) defines the Convention Area as "the waters of the Northwest Atlan-
tic Ocean north of 35*00' north latitude and west of a line extending due north from 35*00' north
latitude and 42'00' west longitude to 59*00' north latitude, thence due west to 44°00' west longi-
tude, and thence due north to the coast of Greenland, and the waters of the Gulf of St. Law-
rence, Davis Strait and Baffin Bay south of 78*00' north latitude." Id. Article 1(2) defines the
Regulatory Area as "that part of the Convention Area which lies beyond the areas in which
coastal States exercise fisheries jurisdiction." Id. at 3.
52 Id. art. 11(2), at 4. For a concise discussion of the organization and functions of NAFO's
various organs, see ELLEN HEY, THE REGIME FOR T=E ExPLorrAION OF TRANSBOUNDARY
MARINE FisI-mIEs RFSOURCES 188-91 (1989).
53 See Convention, supra note 50, art. III, at 4. The General Council coordinates both the
internal relations and the external functions of NAFO. Within the General Council each mem-
ber state has one vote, and decisions are taken by majority vote of all members present as long
as there is a quorum of two-thirds of all the members. See id. art. V, at 6.
54 Id. arts. VI(a)-(d), VII, VIII, at 5-6. The Scientific Council is to provide scientific advice
to the Fisheries Commission either upon the request of the Fisheries Commission or upon its
own initiative. Id. art. VI, at 5. All the contracting parties are members of the Scientific Coun-
cil. Id. art. IX, at 6. Moreover, the scientific advice provided by the Scientific Council is to be
determined by consensus. Where consensus cannot be achieved, the Scientific Council must





The Fisheries Commission - probably NAFO's most important
organ - is responsible "for the management and conservation of the
fishery resources of the Regulatory Area. ' 55 Membership in the Fish-
eries Commission is determined by the General Council and consists
of contracting parties which participate in the fisheries of the Regula-
tory Area and any contracting parties which have provided satisfac-
tory evidence that they expect to participate in the fisheries of the
Regulatory Area during the year of that annual meeting or during the
following calendar year. 6 Each Commission member has one vote,
and as long as there is a quorum of two-thirds of all Commission
members, the Fisheries Commission adopts proposals by majority
vote of all members present and voting.57
The Fisheries Commission may adopt proposals for joint actions
by the contracting parties in order to fulfill NAFO's mandate to man-
age and conserve the fishery resources of the international waters of
the Northwest Atlantic.58 The Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Conven-
tion does not enumerate the type of proposals the Commission may
adopt, and the Commission has no special powers to deal with strad-
dling or highly migratory stocks. However, in adopting proposals re-
lating to straddling or transboundary stocks, the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries Convention stipulates that the Fisheries Commission must
try to achieve consistency and coordination between the Commis-
sion's own measures and the management and conservation measures
adopted by various coastal states within their own EEZs.5 9
The Fisheries Commission carries out at least two important func-
tions. First, Article XI of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Conven-
tion allows the Fisheries Commission, as part of its management
duties, to adopt proposals for the allocation of catches among the vari-
ous member states within the NAFO Regulatory Area.60 In other
words, the Fisheries Commission, based on the advice of the Scientific
Council,61 has the power to establish and allocate fishing quotas to
various NAFO members for assorted fishing stocks found in the inter-
55 Id. art. XI(2), at 7; id. art. 1(2), at 3.
56 Id. art. XIII(1)(a)-(b), at 9. A contracting party is any state or entity which has signed the
Convention on Future Multilateral Co-operation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries.
57 ld art. V(1)-(2), at 5.
58 Id art. XI(2), at 7.
59 Id art. XI(3), at 7.
60 Id. art. XI(4), at 7-8.
61 The Fisheries Commission may refer to the Scientific Council any questions regarding the
conservation and management of stock within the regulatory areas. See id. art. XI(8), at 8.
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national waters of the Northwest Atlantic.62 Second, Article XI also
allows the Fisheries Commission to "adopt proposals for international
measures of control and enforcement within the Regulatory Area" in
order to enforce various NAFO rules and regulations.63 Combined,
these two provisions give the Fisheries Commission broad powers to
formulate and enforce rules for the management and exploitation of
Northwest Atlantic fisheries.
Despite the apparent wide-ranging power of the Fisheries Com-
mission to draft proposals, NAFO has several important weaknesses
which can render NAFO's conservation and management measures
largely ineffective. NAFO's primary weakness is its inability to force
member states to abide by the rules and regulations established by the
Fisheries Commission. Article XII of the Northwest Atlantic Fisher-
ies Convention allows any member of the Fisheries Commission to be
exempted from any new proposal made by the Fisheries Commission
by simply voicing an "objection" to that proposal to the Executive
Secretary within a specified time period.6' If a member objects to the
Commission's proposal, that member is not bound by the proposal,
and the proposal binds only those member states that did not voice
objections. 65 If a majority of members voices objections to the Fisher-
ies Commission's proposal, the proposal does not become binding on
any of the Commission's members unless they agree among them-
selves to be bound by the proposal on a later date.66
Article XII of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Convention also
allows a member of the Fisheries Commission to choose not to be
bound by Commission rules and regulations already in force. A Com-
mission member must simply file a notice of intent not to be bound by
a particular measure at any time after one year from the date on
which the measure became effective and must give notice to the Exec-
utive Secretary of its intention not to be bound.67 If that notice is not
withdrawn, the measure ceases to be binding on that member one
62 Id. art. XI(4), at 7-8. In deciding on the quotas allotted to the various members, the Fish-
eries Commission must take into account the interests of Commission members whose vessels
have traditionally fished in that area and the interests of parties whose various coastal communi-
ties are primarily dependent on fishing for the regulated stock. In setting quotas for a particular
regulated stock, the Fisheries Commission must give special consideration to parties which have
taken measures to conserve that particular stock. Id.
63 Id. art. XI(5), at 7-8.








year after the date of the receipt by the Executive Secretary of the
notice not to be bound. Once a single member has opted out of a
particular Fisheries Commission managerial or conservatory measure
in this manner, any other Commission member may cease to be bound
by that measure upon the date that the Executive Secretary receives
notice of the member's intention not to be bound.68
In sum, NAFO's structure allows a member state to exempt itself
from any regulatory measure or fishing quota established by the Fish-
eries Commission. More importantly, NAFO's voluntary compliance
system allows a member to comply with only those rules and regula-
tions that promote that member's own individual interests. Thus, the
degree to which NAFO is able to achieve compliance with its conser-
vation and regulatory measures will likely depend to a large extent on
how appealing those measures are to all of NAFO's members.
The combination of NAFO's voluntary compliance system with
the traditional freedom of fishing on the high seas as embodied in
UNCLOS III can have a significant and potentially devastating impact
on straddling and migratory fish stocks. Under this regime, any con-
servation and management goals for straddling or highly migratory
stocks implemented either by a coastal state within its own EEZ or by
member states complying with NAFO regulations can be seriously un-
dermined by unregulated fishing on the high seas or in areas adjacent
to the coastal state's EEZ. Allowing each state to disregard NAFO
regulations and set its own fishing quotas creates a powerful disincen-
tive on the part of the coastal states and other NAFO members to
attempt to conserve and properly manage dwindling straddling and
migratory fishery resources. If each NAFO member state is free to
disregard the Fisheries Commission's quotas, a NAFO member state
that complies with the Commission's quotas will be at an economic
disadvantage because its access to scarce and valuable fishery re-
sources will be limited while its fellow member states will be free to
plunder the fishery resources of the Northwest Atlantic largely with-
out regulations. In addition, the possibility that unregulated fishing
might totally deplete a particular fishery resource provides an addi-
tional disincentive for states to follow NAFO quotas. If unregulated
fishing can totally deplete a fishery resource and if there is no way to
enforce NAFO regulations, member states will have little reason to
follow NAFO quotas designed to conserve and manage that resource.
In fact, under these circumstances, a NAFO member state would have
68 Id. In other words, other members who decide to opt out will not have to wait one year
before they are no longer bound by the regulations of the Commission.
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an incentive to disregard NAFO quotas in order to capture as much of
the fishery resource as possible before that resource became totally
depleted.
NAFO's second major weakness lies in its toothless enforcement
mechanisms. 69 Article XVIII of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
Convention states that the parties to the Convention agree to imple-
ment "a scheme of joint international enforcement. ' 70 This scheme
"include[s] provision[s] for reciprocal rights of boarding and inspec-
tion by the Contracting Parties and for flag State prosecution and
sanctions on the basis of evidence resulting from such boarding and
inspections.' In other words, although all member states have the
right to board and inspect the vessels of other member states within
the NAFO Regulatory Area, only the flag state (the state under
whose jurisdiction the vessel operates) can prosecute and sanction
these vessels for violations of NAFO rules.
Although mutual inspection of vessels in the NAFO Regulatory
Area is frequent,72 many flag states appear very reluctant to prosecute
and sanction their own fishing vessels for violating NAFO rules. For
instance, NAFO records indicate that although 49 European vessels
were charged in 1993 with offenses such as misreporting catches or the
use of illegal nets, only six of those charges resulted in prosecutions by
the flag state.73 In short, relying on each state to prosecute its own
vessels does not appear to be a very effective way to enforce NAFO
rules. Thus, even if all NAFO members agree to abide by a particular
set of NAFO rules or quotas, NAFO's weak enforcement mechanisms
may allow member states to break those rules with impunity.
C. 1995 Canada-EU Dispute
The March 1995 Canada-EU dispute can be traced to an earlier
attempt by the Canadian government to bypass altogether NAFO's
weak compliance and enforcement mechanisms by enforcing NAFO
regulations on its own. In 1994, Canada amended one of its own laws
69 For a discussion of NAFO's enforcement mechanism, see WILUAM T. BuRKE, THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FisHEnms 335-36 (1994).
70 Convention, supra note 50, art. XVIII, at 11.
71 Id.
72 For example, in 1994, excluding any additional surveillance conducted from the air, EU
vessels were boarded and inspected 430 times within the NAFO regulatory area. For many EU
vessels, this equaled almost an average of one inspection every two weeks. See Background Note
On EU-Canada Fisheries Relations, REUTER EUR. COMMUNTY REP., Mar. 10, 1995.
73 Fisheries I: Canada Asks to Postpone NAFO Meeting, GREENwIRu, Mar. 20,1995; see also
Mack, supra note 34, at 322-23 (tracing NAFO's failure to an unwillingness of flag states to




to give Canadian authorities the right to unilaterally enforce NAFO
regulations in the NAFO Regulatory Area - the international waters
of the Northwest Atlantic.74 The statute's avowed purpose was "to
enable Canada to take urgent action necessary to prevent further de-
struction of [straddling and migratory fish] stocks and to permit their
rebuilding" within the NAFO Regulatory Area. The act allowed
Canada to define which stocks are "straddling" and to take various
measures to protect them. For instance, the act allowed Canadian au-
thorities to board and search, without a warrant if necessary, any ves-
sel present in NAFO waters for any violations Of NAFO regulations;76
to arrest any person for violating NAFO regulation and to seize any
fishing vessel and its cargo for similar violations.77 The act also au-
thorized Canadian officials to use force in order to disable and board a
foreign fishing vessel,78 and it gave Canada the power to prosecute
and punish violators of NAFO rules in Canadian courts.79
The March 1995 Canada-EU dispute can be largely attributed to
a failure of interested parties to agree within the framework of a re-
gional fisheries organization. The "fish war" between Canada and the
EU began in February 1995 when NAFO reduced the total allowable
catch of Greenland halibut (also known as turbot) in international wa-
ters just outside Canada's EEZ. Concerned that overfishing just
outside Canada's 200 mile zone endangered the survival of the turbot
fishery, the Fisheries Commission reduced the total catch from 60,000
tons to 27,000 tons annually and allotted 60% of the total annual catch
to Canada and 13% to the EU.80 The EU, relying on the "objection"
provision of Article XII of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Conven-
tion, decided to exempt itself from the new quotas. Subsequently, the
EU unilaterally established its own quotas at about 70% (18,000 tons)
74 Coastal Fisheries Protection Act as Amended in 1994,33 I.L.M. 1383 (1994). See generally
Clyde H. Farnsworth, Canada Acts to Cut Fishing by Foreigners, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1994, at 9.
75 See Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, supra note 74, art. 5.1(D), at 1358.
76 Id. art. 7(1)-(2), at 1386.
77 Id. arts. 8-9, at 1386.
78 Id. art. 8(1), at 1386.
79 Id. arts. 17-19, at 1387-88.
80 See Turbot War Takes Diplomatic Turn, FIN. PosT, Mar. 17, 1995. In previous years,
NAFO had awarded the EU about 75% of the total allowable catch of Greenland Halibut while
Canada received about 12%. See William T. Abel, Fishing for an International Norm to Govern
Straddling Stocks: The Canada-Spain Dispute of 1995,27 U. MIAMi INTER-AM. L. REv. 553,566
(1996). See generally Canada Presses for Grand Banks Cod Ban, FIN. PosT, Feb. 15, 1994.
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of the total allowable annual catch of 27,000 tons as determined by the
Fisheries Commission.8'
Under the current international fishery regime embodied in UN-
CLOS III and regional fisheries organizations such as NAFO, the
EU's actions were permissible. Because the EU legally opted out of
the new NAFO quotas and because EU ships were fishing in interna-
tional waters, the EU technically had the right to establish its own
quotas under the traditional principles of freedom of fishing on the
high seas.s2 Although the EU's actions might have had potentially
serious consequences for the preservation of the Greenland Halibut,
they probably did not constitute any violations of international fishery
law under UNCLOS 111.83
In response to the EU's "objection," the Canadian government
imposed a unilateral moratorium forbidding EU vessels from fishing
for Greenland halibut in the international waters of the Northwest
Atlantic adjacent to Canada's EEZ. 4 When Spanish ships violated
this moratorium, Canadian authorities boarded, seized, and im-
pounded a Spanish trawler, the Estai, and cut the nets of another
Spanish ship under the authority of the amended Coastal Fisheries
Protection Act for alleged violations of NAFO quotas and fishing reg-
ulations.8 5 When the vessel was towed into a Canadian port, further
investigation revealed that the vessel had violated several NAFO reg-
ulations including using nets with holes smaller than allowed by
NAFO regulations and fishing for immature Greenland halibut.8 6 The
vessel also contained a secret storage room containing 25 tons of
American plaice, a fish which is under a NAFO moratorium, and the
81 See EU Charges Canada with Turbot War Escalation, FIN. POST, Mar. 4, 1995; Peter Mor-
ton, Canada Vows Action On Spanish Fishing 'Pirates,' FIN. PosT, Mar. 7, 1995; Jessica Mat-
thews, On the High Seas: The Law of the Jungle, WASH. PosT, Apr. 9, 1995.
82 See UNCLOS III, supra note 4, art. 87(1), at 128-29.
83 See Background Note On EU-Canada Fisheries Relations, supra note 72 (arguing that
once the EU validly invoked NAFO's objection provision, its vessels were no longer legally
bound by the NAFO quota). Under UNCLOS III, states have the obligation to attempt to
cooperate to preserve and manage straddling and migratory fish stocks. Although the issue has
not been resolved, it seems unlikely that the EU violated its duty to cooperate under UNCLOS
III by legally exempting itself from NAFO quotas. See generally Jon K. Goltz, Comment, The
Sea of Okhotsk Peanut Hole: How the United Nations Draft Agreement on Straddling Stocks
Might Preserve the Pollack Fishery, 4 PAc. Rim. L. & POL'Y J. 443, 458 (1995) (arguing that
nations may fail to reach an agreement without violating their duty under UNCLOS III to seek
to agree). In any case, the general duty to cooperate under UNCLOS III is probably too vague
to be functionally enforceable. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
84 Robert Kozak, Canada Seizes Fishing Ships on High Sea, REtuaRS, Mar. 10, 1995.
85 Id. See also Fisheries: Canada Slashes Net of Spanish Trawler, supra note 1.
86 Fisheries: EU/Canada Fish War Highlights Conservation Issues, Eun. ENV'T, Mar. 20,1995;




captain of the vessel had apparently kept two separate log books: one
containing figures meant for inspection by NAFO authorities and the
other for the Captain's personal use.s7
The actions taken by Canadian authorities against the Spanish
vessels arguably constituted numerous violations of the customary law
of the sea. For instance, the Canadian authorities theoretically vio-
lated the traditional freedom of fishing on the high seas by imposing a
fishing ban on a foreign vessel outside of Canada's 200 mile EEZ. In
addition, by forcefully boarding, searching, and seizing a foreign ship,
the Canadian authorities violated the customary exclusive legal right
of the flag state to exercise legislative and enforcement jurisdiction
over its vessels on the high seas.8 8 However, Canadian authorities ar-
gued that given the feebleness of NAFO's enforcement and compli-
ance mechanisms, only unilateral Canadian enforcement of NAFO
regulations could ensure the conservation and proper management of
the straddling fish stock.89 As Brian Tobin, Canada's fisheries minis-
ter, said regarding the amended Coastal Fisheries Protection Act:
There is currently nothing in the books allowing us to extend our author-
ity beyond 200 miles, and this legislation will do just that. Some people
will think it runs against international law, but others will think other-
wise, and we cannot afford to wait for years while this is debated because
by that time the fishery will be purely an academic thing.90
87 See EU/Canada Fish War Highlights Conservation Issues, supra note 86; Canadian Author-
ities Released the Spanish Trawler at the Centre of its Fishing Dispute with the European Union,
EUR. EN,'T, Mar. 8, 1995.
88 For a complete list of alleged violations see Commission Calls on Canada to Negotiate in
Good Faith, RAPD PRESS RELEASE, Mar. 29, 1995 (accusing Canada of mismanaging its own
fisheries and violating international law through its actions against the Estai).
89 See generally EnvironmenL Latest Canada-Spain Fish Row Highlights U.N. Meet, INTER
PREss RELEASE, Mar. 27, 1995 (quoting Brian Tobin); Spain, Canada Head for New Clashes in
Fish War, AGENCE FRANCE PREssE, Apr. 15, 1995; Edward Tang, Whose Fish Is I Anyway?,
SnRArrs Tims, Mar. 26, 1995.
90 Quoted in Gavin Hill, Ottawa May be Adrift with New High-Seas Fishing Law, FIN. TimFs,
Apr. 6, 1994. See generally Abel, supra note 80, at 568 (outlining Canada's legal and practical
justifications for its actions in the Northwest Atlantic).
Canadian fishery authorities may have been motivated by more than perceived EU viola-
tions of NAFO rules in pursuing their unprecedented actions. Prior to the 1995 Canada-EU
dispute, Canadian fishery authorities were forced to take drastic actions to attempt to preserve
dwindling fishery stocks. Largely because of Canadian mismanagement, in 1992 the Canadian
government was forced to impose a moratorium on all cod fishing off the coast of Newfound-
land. This moratorium caused the most massive layoff in Canada's history. See Susan Pollack,
The Last Fish: Closing of Newfoundland Fishing Grounds, SImRA, July 1995, at 48. See also
William McCloskey, Fencing the World's Oceans, BALTIMORE SUN, Apr. 28, 1995. With
thousands of Canadian fishermen out of work, the Canadian government arguably had some
good domestic political reasons to attempt to prevent unregulated fishing by foreigners in inter-
national waters. See generally Commission Calls on Canada to Negotiate in Good Faith, supra
note 88 (accusing Canada of attempting to hide the "shortcomings of its own fish conservation
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After some diplomatic maneuvering and a good deal of fiery
political rhetoric,9' Canada and the EU resolved their dispute peace-
fully.9 2 Canada agreed to repeal portions of the Coastal Fisheries Pro-
tection Act prohibiting Spanish and Portuguese vessels from fishing in
the NAFO Regulatory Area and allowing Canadian authorities to
seize vessels fishing in international waters.9 3 The agreement also re-
vised NAFO quotas and awarded both Canada and the EU about
41% of NAFO's total allowable catch of Greenland Halibut for the
remainder of 1995. 94 Canada and the EU also agreed to implement a
new system of monitoring requiring each contracting party to place
independent observers on all vessels fishing within the Regulatory
Area and to implement a system of satellite tracking on at least 35%
of the ships fishing within the Regulatory Area.95
Although a wide acceptance of the tougher inspection and moni-
toring provisions enshrined in the Canada-EU agreement may poten-
tially increase compliance with NAFO regulations,96 the bilateral
regime by blaming the EU"); John DeMont, Tobin's War: Canada's Fiery Fisheries Minister Wins
New Allies in his Battle With Foreign Fleets, MAcLEA.'s, Apr. 10, 1995, at 14 (arguing that "at a
minimum, the great turbot war had taken the spotlight off [Canada's own] role in mismanaging
the Atlantic fishery").
91 Shortly after the Canadian capture of the Estai, Spain sent its own ships into the North-
west Atlantic, and tensions were high right up to the signing of the Canada-EC agreement which
resolved the dispute. See Buerkle, supra note 3; Nickerson, supra note 1; Spain, Canada Head
for New Clashes in Fish War, supra note 3; Clyde H. Farnsworth, North Atlantic Fishing Pact
Could Become World Model, N.Y. TimEs, Apr. 17, 1995.
In response to Canada's actions, protesters in Madrid, led by members of fishermen's fami-
lies, pounded the Canadian embassy with hundreds of eggs and dead fish. In addition, the Span-
ish government took revenge upon Canadian tourists for the actions of their government by
requiring them to obtain visas in order to vacation in Spain. See Darnton, supra note 1. As the
rhetoric escalated, the EU's Fisheries Commissioner accused Canada of turning the high seas
into the "wild west" by playing the role of "self appointed lawmaker, sheriff and judge." See
Environment: Latest Canada-Spain Fish Row Highlights U.N. Meet, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Mar.
27, 1995.
92 Canada Fish War Over After Five Weeks of High Seas Drama, DuErscHm PRESSE-AGEN-
TUR, Apr. 16, 1995; Anne Swardson, Canada, EU Reach Agreement Aimed at Ending Fishing
War, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 1995.
93 See Canada-European Community: Agreed Minutes On The Conservation and Manage-
ment of Fish Stocks, 34 I.L.M. 1260, 1263 (1995). See also Buerkle, supra note 91.
94 See Buerkle, supra note 3. In other words, the agreement awards the EU with 5,013 more
tons of turbot for the remainder of 1995 than it was previously entitled to under the NAFO
quota. Id.
95 See id.; Farnsworth, supra note 91. See generally EU/Canada: EU Signs Easter Deal on
Fishing Rights, AGRI SERVICE INT'L, May 5, 1995; Abel, supra note 80, at 570-71.
96 Beginning in January 1996, the monitoring and enforcement provisions enshrined in the
agreement which ended the Canada-EU dispute were applied to all NAFO members. Moreover,
requiring contracting parties to provide independent observers on every ship within the Regula-
tory Area has proven effective in ensuring compliance with NAFO rules. See Enforcement Meas-




agreement itself fails to address problems surrounding NAFO's volun-
tary compliance structure as well as weaknesses in NAFO's prosecu-
tion and sanctioning mechanisms. Because of its failure to address
these deeper structural weaknesses, the Canada-EU agreement is un-
likely to provide a model for a lasting and meaningful solution to
NAFO's deep-seeded problems.
IV. UNITED NATIONS AGREEMENT RELATING TO THE
CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT OF STRADDLING AND
HIGHLY MIGRATORY FISH STOCKS
On August 4, 1995, the United Nations Conference on Straddling
Fish Stock and Highly Migratory Fish Stock adopted an Agreement
Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (Fish Stocks Agreement). 97 The stated
purpose of the Fish Stocks Agreement is to "ensure the long-term
conservation and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks and highly
migratory fish stocks through effective implementation of the relevant
provisions" of UNCLOS I1.98 The Fish Stocks Agreement is also in-
tended to prevent international conflicts over fishing fights on the
high seas like the 1995 Canada-EU dispute.99
The Fish Stocks Agreement contains several important and inno-
vative provisions. 00 The Fish Stocks Agreement calls for the applica-
tion of the precautionary approach to the conservation, management,
and exploitation of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.' 0' The
precautionary approach requires states which agree to be bound by
the agreement to obtain and share the best scientific information
available and to take into account any uncertainties relating to the
97 See Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 6, at 1542.
98 Id. art. 2, at 1548.
99 See UN Conference on High Seas Fishing Adopts Legal Agreement, Press Release on
Adoption of Agreement, Nov. 9, 1995.
100 The Fish Stocks Agreement's general provisions give a good indication of the full range of
issues the agreement purports to cover. For example, some of the general provisions require
states to: (1) adopt measures to ensure the long-term sustainability of straddling and migratory
fish stocks; (2) ensure that these measures are based on the best scientific evidence available; (3)
adopt measures to protect, where necessary, species belonging to the same ecosystem or depen-
dent on or associated with the straddling or migratory stock in question; (4) minimize pollution,
waste, and discard catch by lost or abandoned gear, and catch of non-target species; (5) protect
biodiversity in marine environment; and (6) promote and conduct scientific research and de-
velop technologies in support of fishery conservation. See Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 6,
art. 5, at 1550. See generally Goltz, supra note 83, at 463-71 (outlining contours of the Fish
Stocks Agreement in its draft form); Mack, supra note 34, at 326-31 (describing contours of the
Fish Stocks Agreement).
101 See Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 6, art. 6(1), at 1550.
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size, productivity, and condition of straddling and migratory fishing
stock in order to improve decision-making regarding the conservation
and exploitation of these and related fishing resources. 10 2 The precau-
tionary approach requires states to err on the side of conservation in
setting fishing quotas and implementing conservation policies when
scientific information is uncertain, unreliable, or incomplete. 10 3 Thus,
parties bound by this agreement will no longer be able to use the lack
of adequate scientific information to justify their failure to adopt
proper conservation measures.
The Fish Stocks Agreement also contains groundbreaking provi-
sions regulating international cooperation concerning straddling and
migratory fish stocks. The Fish Stocks Agreement requires coastal
states with jurisdiction over straddling or migratory fish stocks and
other states whose nationals fish for such stocks in the adjacent high
seas to seek directly or through appropriate regional fisheries organi-
zations to cooperate in the adoption and implementation of measures
necessary to conserve these stocks in the adjacent high seas.10 4 As
part of their duty to cooperate, the Fish Stocks Agreement requires
coastal states and high-sea fishing states (i.e., states fishing for the
straddling or migratory stocks on the high seas) to become members
of regional fisheries organizations or to participate in such arrange-
ments by agreeing to apply the conservation and management meas-
ures established by such organizations or arrangements. 05
Furthermore, under the Fish Stocks Agreement, only those states
which are members of such organizations or which agree to abide by
the conservation and management measures of such organizations or
arrangements shall have access to the fishery resources managed and
102 Id. art. 6(3)(a)-(d). The precautionary approach is apparently intended to apply not only
to straddling and migratory fishing stock, but also to non-target and associated or dependent
species and their environments. See id. art. 6(5).
103 Id. art. 6(2). According to Article 6(2): "States shall be more cautious when information is
uncertain, unreliable or inadequate. The absence of adequate scientific information shall not be
used as a reason for postponing or failing to take conservation and management measures." Id.
104 Id. art. 7(1)(a), at 1551. According to the Fish Stocks Agreement, conservation and man-
agement measures established for the high seas and those adopted for areas under national juris-
diction must be compatible. Article 7(2) states: "In determining compatible conservation and
management measures, States shall: (a) take into account the conservation and management
measures adopted and applied in accordance with article 61 of the [UNCLOS III] in respect of
the same stocks by coastal States within areas under national jurisdiction and ensure that meas-
ures established in respect of such stocks for the high seas do not undermine the effectiveness of
such measures." Id.
105 Id. art. 8(3), at 1553. Where there are no regional or subregional fisheries organization,
the Fish Stocks Agreement requires the relevant coastal states and high-sea fishing states to form
such organizations or arrangements in order to ensure adequate conservation and management




protected by those organizations or arrangements. 10 6 By limiting ac-
cess to high seas fisheries to states that agree to abide by conservation
and management measures established by fishery organizations or ar-
rangements, the Fish Stocks Agreement constitutes a significant de-
parture from the unrestricted freedom of fishing on the high seas
embodied in traditional principles of fisheries law.107
Other innovative provisions of the Fish Stocks Agreement deal
with compliance and enforcement of the various conservation and
management measures established by regional fisheries organizations
and arrangements. The Fish Stocks Agreement places the initial bur-
den of enforcement on the flag state - the state under whose flag a
particular fishing vessel is operating.108 In fact, the Fish Stocks Agree-
ment prohibits a flag state from authorizing a vessel to operate under
its flag unless that state is capable of effectively managing and control-
ling that vessel. 0 9 Under the Fish Stocks Agreement, the flag state is
responsible for ensuring that its vessels do not violate regional conser-
vation and management measures through mechanisms such as the
issuance of licenses, permits, and other regulations established by re-
gional fisheries organizations. 1 0 In addition, the flag state is required
to monitor and control its fishing vessels through both national ob-
server programs and inspection schemes as well as regional and sub-
regional observer schemes including satellite transmitter tracking of
106 Id. art. 8(4). Article 17 of the Fish Stocks Agreement allows states that are members of
regional fisheries organizations or that agree to abide by the rules of such organizations to "take
measures consistent with this Agreement and international law to deter activities of such vessels
which undermine the effectiveness of subregional or regional conservation and management
measures." See id. art. 17(4), at 1559.
107 As Ambassador Satya N. Nandon of Fiji, Chairman of the United Nations Conference on
Straddling Fish Stock and Highly Migratory Fish Stock, summed up: "It's no longer a free-for-all
situation. The freedom to fish on the high seas no longer exists as it did under the Law of the
Sea Convention." Quoted in William Branigin, World's Fishing Nations Net Pact to End Con-
flicts, INr'L HELD TRm., Aug. 5, 1995; Alan Toulin, Fishing For New Rules: Canada Hopes to
Negotiate Fish Stocks' Protection Rules at UN, Fin. PosT, Mar. 18, 1995.
108 Fish Stocks Agreement supra note 6, art. 18(1)-(2), at 1553. Article 18(1) states: "A State
whose vessels fish on the high seas shall take such measures as may be necessary to ensure that
vessels flying its flag comply with subregional and regional conservation and management meas-
ures and that such vessels do not engage in any activity which undermines the effectiveness of
such measures." 1d.
109 Id. art. 18(2). Article 18(2) states: "A state shall authorize the use of vessels flying its flag
for fishing on the high seas only where it is able to exercise effectively its responsibilities in
respect of such vessels under the Convention and this Agreement." Id.
110 Id, art. 18(3). Article 18(3) requires the flag state to establish a national record of fishing
vessels authorized to fish on the high seas and to provide this information to other interested
states. In addition, the flag state is required to establish rules for the marking of fishing vessels
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fishing vessels."' Furthermore, the flag state has the primary respon-
sibility for the prosecution and sanctioning of any violations commit-
ted by vessels operating under its flag.11 2
In contrast, the Fish Stocks Agreement does not rely solely on the
actions of the flag state to enforce regional conservation and manage-
ment measures. In a significant departure from the traditional princi-
ple that only the flag state has sovereignty over its vessels, the Fish
Stocks Agreement allows states which are members of regional fisher-
ies organizations to board and inspect fishing vessels flying the flag of
another state which is a party to the Fish Stocks Agreement but which
is not necessarily a member of that particular fisheries organization in
order to check for violations of conservation and management meas-
ures.113 If after an inspection there are reasonable grounds for believ-
ing that a fishing vessel is violating regional conservation and
management measures, the state inspecting the vessel must secure evi-
dence of these alleged violations and notify the state under whose flag
the ship is registered. 1 The flag state could then either proceed with
its own investigation and enforcement actions or could authorize the
inspecting state to conduct the appropriate investigation and to take
appropriate enforcement actions.'15 If the flag state does not respond
within three working days to the allegations made by the inspecting
state, and if the alleged violations are classified as "serious," the in-
spectors may remain on board to secure evidence and may detain the
vessel in port for "further investigation.""' 6
111 Id. art. 18(3)(a)-(h). For example, Article 18(3)(g) requires the flag state to allow author-
ized inspectors from other states to board and inspect the vessels in accordance with the rules
and regulations outlined by the various regional fisheries organizations. Id.
112 Id. art. 19(1)(b), at 1560. Article 19(1)(b) requires the flag state to investigate fully and
completely any alleged violations of fishing regulations by a vessel flying its flag. In addition,
according to Article 19(1)(d): "If [a flag state is] satisfied that sufficient evidence is available in
respect of an alleged violation, [the flag state shall] refer the case to its authorities with a view to
instituting proceedings, without delay, in accordance with its laws and, where appropriate, detain
the vessel concerned." Id. at 1561.
113 Id. art. 21(1), at 1562. According to Article 21(1): "In any high seas area covered by a
subregional or regional fisheries management organization or arrangement, a State Party which
is a member of or a participant in such organization or arrangement may, through its duly au-
thorized inspectors, board and inspect, in accordance with paragraph 2, fishing vessels flying the
flag of another State Party to this Agreement, whether or not such State Party is also a member
of or a participant in the organization or arrangement, for the purpose of ensuring compliance
with conservation and management measures for straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish
stocks established by that organization or arrangement." Id.
114 Id. art. 21(5).
115 Id. art. 21(6)-(7).
116 Id. art. 21(8)-(11), at 1563-64. Article 21(11) spells out a list of "serious" violations. Some




The Fish Stocks Agreement contains several provisions intended
to provide safeguards against potential abuses of the right to board
and inspect vessels under foreign jurisdiction. Article 22 of the Fish
Stocks Agreement lists certain basic guidelines for the boarding and
inspection of vessels which are intended to curb the unnecessary use
of force and to prevent undue interference with legitimate fishing op-
erations. 1 7 Article 21(16) of the Fish Stocks Agreement requires that
actions taken against foreign vessels "be proportionate to the serious-
ness of the violation.""' 8 Furthermore, the Fish Stocks Agreement of-
fers an additional significant safeguard against potential abuse by
opening the inspecting state to liability for damage or loss stemming
from illegal, abusive, or unreasonable actions taken during the board-
ing and inspection of fishing vessels.119
Finally, the Fish Stocks Agreement contains provisions dealing
with states which are not parties to the Fish Stocks Agreement. Ac-
cording to Article 33, party states shall not only encourage non-parties
to become parties to the Agreement, but also "shall take measures
consistent with this Agreement and international law to deter the ac-
tivities of vessels flying the flag of nonparties which undermine the
effective implementation of this Agreement."' 2 ° In other words, the
catch and catch-related data; (c) fishing in closed areas or during closed season; (d) fishing after
attainment of quota established by the relevant regional organizations; (e) using prohibited fish-
ing gear;, or (f) multiple violations which would together constitute a serious disregard of conser-
vation and management measures. Id. at 1564.
117 Id. art. 22, at 1565. Article 22 spells out some of the basic provisions for the boarding and
inspection of fishing vessels by states which are parties to the Draft Agreement. For instance,
according to Article 22(0, the inspectors are to "avoid the use of force except when and to the
degree necessary to ensure the safety of the inspectors and where the inspectors are obstructed
in the execution of their duties. The degree of force used shall not exceed that reasonably re-
quired in the circumstances." Id. In addition, Article 21(2) allows regional and subregional fish-
eries organizations to establish their own procedures for the boarding and inspection of vessels
as long as those procedures are consistent with the procedures spelled out in Article 22 of the
Draft Agreement. Id. at 1565-1566.
118 Id. art. 21(16), at 1565. Article 21(16) states: "Action taken by States other than the flag
State in respect of vessels having engaged in activities contrary to subregional or regional conser-
vation and management measures shall be proportional to the seriousness of the violation." Id
119 Id. art. 21(18). Article 21(18) states: "States shall be liable for damage or loss attributable
to them arising from actions taken pursuant to this article when such action is unlawful or ex-
ceeds that reasonably required in the light of available information to implement the provisions
of this article." Id In addition, under Article 21(12) the flag state retains the right to (at any
time) take actions to fulfill its obligations to investigate, prosecute, and punish the offending
vessel. Id. at 1564.
120 Id. art. 33, at 1570. Article 20(7) contains similar language: "State Parties which are
members of a subregional or regional fisheries management organization or participants in a
subregional or regional fisheries management arrangement may take action in accordance with
international law, including through recourse to subregional or regional procedures established
for his purpose, to deter vessels which have engaged in activities which undermine the effective-
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Fish Stocks Agreement empowers regional fisheries organizations
(through their members) to take whatever enforcement actions are
deemed necessary, within international law, against non-parties to
achieve the goals of the Fish Stocks Agreement.
VI. EVALUATION OF THE FISH STOCKS AGREEMENT IN LIGHT OF
THE 1995 CANADA-EU DispuTE
As the 1995 Canada-EU dispute demonstrates, fisheries law deal-
ing with straddling and migratory fish stock is a potentially volatile
area of the law in need of serious reform. The Fish Stocks Agreement
is a laudable attempt to create an international regime for the conser-
vation and management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.
However, while the Fish Stocks Agreement contains several innova-
tive provisions, it also contains crucial ambiguities which could seri-
ously hamper its ability to address some of the main problems which
contributed to the 1995 Canada-EU dispute.
In a major step towards the creation of a workable international
regime for the management and conservation of straddling and highly
migratory fish stocks, the Fish Stocks Agreement simultaneously
strengthens the power of regional fishery organizations and substan-
tially limits the traditional freedom of fishing on the high seas by re-
quiring all states wishing to fish for straddling or migratory species on
the high seas to join regional fishery organizations or comply with the
measures established by such fishery organizations. 21 Parties that re-
fuse to join or comply with regulations and quotas established by re-
gional fishery organizations are denied access to the fishery resources
managed by those organizations." z Moreover, by giving individual
members of regional fishery organizations the power to enforce re-
gional conservation measures and to exclude non-complying non-
members from fishing for the regulated fish stock, the Fish Stocks
Agreement gives states with a strong interest in preserving various
straddling or migratory stocks (i.e., Canada) the authority to do so.'2 3
ness of or otherwise violate the conservation and management measures established by that
organization or arrangement from fishing on the high seas in the subregion or region until such
time as appropriate action is taken by the flag state." Id. at 1562.
121 See id. art. 8(3)-(5). See also supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
122 Ld. art 8(4), at 1553.
123 Individual states that are members of regional fishery organizations and that have strad-
dling or migratory resources partially present within their own EEZs (L.a, Canada) will have a
strong incentive to preserve and properly manage these resources in order to preserve them for
future unrestricted use within their own EEZs. The Fish Stocks Agreement creates a potentially




In sum, it appears that under the Fish Stocks Agreement non-member
states will no longer be allowed to flaunt regional fishery regulations
simply by fishing in international waters.
At the same time, the Fish Stocks Agreement, by prohibiting
non-complying non-members from fishing for the regulated stocks in
international waters, provides a very powerful incentive for non-mem-
bers to join regional fishery organizations. For instance, shortly after
the introduction of the Fish Stocks Agreement, the United States
joined NAFO. 2 Although the United States took part in negotia-
tions surrounding NAFO's creation, it did not formally join NAFO
largely because of pressure from American fishermen, who, as long as
the United States was not a NAFO member, could fish in NAFO's
Regulatory Area with immunity from NAFO rules and quotas. 25
With the introduction of the Fish Stocks Agreement, the United
States had a strong interest in joining NAFO not only to maintain its
access to the high sea fisheries controlled by NAFO, but also to par-
ticipate in NAFO's rulemaking and quota-setting functions. 126 Thus,
the Fish Stocks Agreement strengthens regional fishery organizations
not only by providing members with the authority to enforce regional
rules against non-complying non-members, but also by providing a
powerful incentive for non-members to join these organizations.
While the Fish Stocks Agreement strengthens regional fishery or-
ganizations in important and substantial ways, the primary weakness
of the Fish Stocks Agreement may be its failure to adequately address
the consensual nature of organizations like NAFO.127 The Fish Stocks
serve straddling and migratory fish stocks the authority to enforce regional fishery rules against
non-complying non-members.
124 See Tobin Welcomes U.S. Entry Into NAFO, CANADA NEwswurn, Nov. 30, 1995. See also
McCloskey, supra note 90.
125 See McCloskey, supra note 90. See also Mack, supra note 34, at 322 (discussing the failure
of the United States to join NAFO prior to the Fish Stocks Agreement).
126 To gain access to a regulated straddling or migratory fish stock under the Fish Stocks
Agreement, a non-member must either join a regional fishery organization or comply with the
rules and regulations established by such an organization. See infra note 105 and accompanying
text. Although parties who decide not to join a regional fishery organization and chose instead
to comply with the rules established by that regional fishery organization will gain access to the
regulated fish stocks, they will have no voice in the actual formulation of regulations which will
govern their fishing activities. Consequently, most parties will want to join a regional fishery
organization not only to get access to the regulated fish stock, but also to play a role in the
rulemaking functions of those regional organizations.
127 The drafters of the Fish Stocks Agreement apparently foresaw the need to strengthen the
structures of regional fishery organizations. Article 13 of the Fish Stocks Agreement states:
"States shall cooperate to strengthen existing subregional and regional fisheries management
organizations and arrangements in order to improve their effectiveness in establishing and im-
plementing conservation and management measures for straddling fish stocks and highly migra-
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Agreement relies heavily on the ability of various members of re-
gional fishery organizations to reach agreements on common meas-
ures, quotas, and procedures. 28 However, NAFO structures do not
require all of its member states to agree on such vital issues as the
proper allotment of fishing quotas. 29 In other words, although the
Fish Stocks Agreement requires members of regional fishery organi-
zations to agree on numerous issues, it fails to address the possibility
that the structures of regional fishery organizations may not require
their members to agree. 3 °
tory fish stocks." See Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 6, at 1556. It seems unlikely, however,
that such a vague provision will work to improve the effectiveness of regional organizations such
as NAFO.
128 According to Article 10: "In fulfilling their obligation to cooperate through subregional or
regional fisheries management organizations or arrangements, States shall (a) agree on and
comply with conservation and management measures to ensure the long-term sustainability of
straddling fish stock and highly migratory fish stock; (b) agree, as appropriate, on participatory
rights such as allocations of allowable catch or levels of fishing effort; (c) adopt and apply any
generally recommend international minimum standards for the responsible conduct of fishing
operations;... (e) agree on standards for collection, reporting, verification and exchange of data
on fisheries for the stocks .... (emphasis added) See id. at 1554-55.
129 NAFO's structure allows any member of its Fisheries Commission to be exempted from
any new proposals simply by voicing an "objection" to that proposal within a specified time
period. NAFO's rules also allow any member to chose not to be bound by any of NAFO's rules
and regulations already in force. For a more detailed explanation of NAFO's structures and
procedures see supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
130 For example, Article 30 of the Fish Stock Agreement requires compulsory and binding
arbitration of various disputes arising under the Fish Stock Agreement. Under Article 30, states
would choose from the options for dispute resolution established under UNCLOS III which
include the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea, the International Court of Justice, or
an ad hoe tribunal. See Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 6, art. 30, at 1569. Although the
mandatory binding arbitration provisions of Article 30 apply to disputes between members of
regional fishery organizations, neither Article 30 nor the entire Fish Stocks Agreement contains
a provision addressing the possibility that regional fishery organizations may not require all of
their members to agree on common rules, policies, or quotas.
Moreover, NAFO is not the only regional fisheries organization whose consensual nature
allows its members to opt out of various regulatory provisions and recommendations. For in-
stance, members of the International Baltic Sea Fishery Commission (IBSFC), a regional fisher-
ies organization regulating the living resources of the Baltic Sea and Belts, have the option of
"opting" out of recommendations proposed by the IBSFC. See Convention on Fishing and Con-
servation of the Living Resources in the Baltic Sea and Belts, 12 I.L.M. 1291, 1294-95, art. XI(2),
(4) (1973) (Gdansk Convention) (spelling out procedures for opting-out of the 1973 Gdansk
Convention); Protocol Amending Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources
in the Baltic Sea and the Belts to Provide for EEC Membership, 22 I.L.M. 704 art. XI(4)(a)-(b)
(clarifying opt out provisions of the 1973 Gdansk Convention). See also Hey, supra note 52, at
176 (outlining IBSFC's opt out procedure).
Similarly, members of the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), a regional
fisheries organization charged with the preservation and management of the living resources of
the North-East Atlantic, can opt out of NEAFC recommendations. See Hey supra note 52, at
181-185 (outlining NEAFC's structure, functions, and opting out-out procedure); Convention on




Under the Fish Stocks Agreement, the primary responsibility of a
state desiring to fish in an area governed by a regional fishery organi-
zation is to join or to conform with the regulations established by that
regional fishery organization.1 3 Once a state joins such an organiza-
tion, that state is merely obliged to seek "to agree upon the measures
necessary for the conservation" of the relevant straddling or migratory
fish stocks. 32 When a regional fishery organization like NAFO does
not require all of its members to actually agree on any particular mea-
sure or quota and allows members to exempt themselves from any
measure or quota, there is a lack of a pragmatic and efficient mecha-
nism to enforce the Fish Stocks Agreement's general duty to pursue
cooperation within the framework of a regional fisheries organization.
Although other member states are free to litigate the issue of whether
or not a particular member has lived up to its duty to seek coopera-
tion,133 the vagueness of this duty is unlikely to make it enforceable. 34
Thus, it appears that the consensual nature of organizations like
NAFO can undermine the effectiveness of the Fish Stocks Agreement
in achieving cooperation in the context of a regional fishery
organization.
In addition, although the Fish Stocks Agreement contains impor-
tant provisions dealing with the detection and monitoring of potential
violations of regional fishery regulations,'135 it places the main burden
of enforcement of these regulations on the flag state. 36 By entrusting
the flag state with the primary responsibility of prosecuting and sanc-
tioning various violations of regional fishery rules, the Fish Stocks
Agreement fails to address a fundamental weakness in NAFO's prose-
L.), art. 12(2)(b) (1981) (outlining NEAFC's opting-out provisions). See generally Hey, supra
note 50, at 225-30 (outlining the structure, organization and opting-out procedures of the Inter-
national Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT)); id. at 209-16 (outlining
the structure, organization and opting-out procedures of the Permanent South Pacific Commis-
sion (PSPC)).
131 See Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 6, art. 8(3), at 1553. Only states who join such
fishery organizations will have access to the fishery resources regulated by those organizations.
See id. art 8(4).
132 Id. art. 7(1)(a), at 1551.
133 Id. art. 30, at 1569 (outlining procedures for the settlement of disputes).
134 In this respect, the Fish Stocks Agreement's duty to cooperate may be just as unenforce-
able as the duty to cooperate regarding straddling and migratory fish stocks enshrined in UN-
CLOS III. See Christopherson, supra note 43, at 374 (arguing that the duty to cooperate under
the Fish Stocks Agreement is as "unenforcably vague" as the duty to cooperate under UNCLOS
III). See also supra note 48 and accompanying text.
135 For a discussion of those provisions see notes 113-16 and accompanying test. For instance,
satellite monitoring of fishing vessels in international waters has proven an effective, but expen-
sive, method of regulations. See Christopherson, supra note 43, at 377.
136 See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
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cution and sanctioning mechanism which contributed to the 1995 Can-
ada-EU dispute. Although under the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
Convention each NAFO member has reciprocal rights of boarding
and inspection, 37 only flag states have the right to prosecute and sanc-
tion their own vessels for violations of NAFO regulations. 3 8 Some
NAFO flag states, however, have proven unable or unwilling to prose-
cute and sanction their own vessels.139 Although the Fish Stocks
Agreement allows other NAFO members to take some limited actions
if the flag state is unable or unwilling to act, 4 ° the primary duty to
prosecute and sanction violators still lies with the flag state.14 ' Conse-
quently, it appears that even under the Fish Stocks Agreement, the
effectiveness of NAFO's enforcement procedures will largely depend
on the willingness of the flag states to prosecute and sanction viola-
tions of NAFO rules. 42
NAFO's voluntary compliance regime can compound problems
of enforcement. For instance, a NAFO member that disagrees with a
quota or regulation established by NAFO's Fishery Commission and
that opts out of that quota or regulation is explicitly allowing vessels
flying its flag to violate those NAFO guidelines. Under the Fish
Stocks Agreement, each NAFO member has the primary duty to en-
force regional rules and regulations and to prosecute and sanction any
violators operating under that member's jurisdiction. However, a
NAFO member that opts out of a NAFO regulation will be very un-
likely to fulfill its enforcement mandate under the Fish Stocks Agree-
ment by prosecuting and sanctioning its own vessels for violating
NAFO rules which, under valid NAFO procedures, no longer apply to
it. Thus, in certain situations, the Fish Stocks Agreement's prosecu-
tion and sanctioning provisions can be incompatible with NAFO's
consensual nature. This incompatibility can create a good deal of am-
biguity as to the responsibilities of NAFO members under the Fish
137 In this way, NAFO's monitoring and detection procedures do not differ substantially from
the mutual inspection procedures embodied in the Fish Stocks Agreement. See generally supra
note 113 and accompanying text.
138 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
139 See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
140 See generally Goltz, supra note 83, at 471-72 (describing the Fish Stocks Agreement's en-
forcement procedures).
141 See supra note 112 and accompanying text. See also Goltz, supra note 83, at 472 (conclud-
ing that the Fish Stocks Agreement rests ultimate prosecutorial and sanctioning authority in the
flag state); Mack, supra note 34, at 331 (arguing that the Fish Stocks Agreement still leaves the
flag state with the primary responsibility over investigation and sanctioning).
142 It is arguable, however, that the threat of continued satellite monitoring, boarding and in-
port inspection might pressure the flag state into taking actions to prevent continuing violations.




Stocks Agreement and can potentially severely weaken the effective-
ness of the Fish Stock Agreement's enforcement measures.
VI. CONCLUSION
The March 1995 Canada-EU fishing dispute can be largely attrib-
uted to deficiencies in existing fisheries law dealing with straddling
and migratory fish stocks embodied in UNCLOS III and NAFO. UN-
CLOS III contains broad and probably unenforceable mandates re-
garding straddling and migratory fish stocks and leaves their
management to regional fishery organizations such as NAFO. NAFO
lacks the authority to impose quotas and regulations upon its mem-
bers, and even if all NAFO's members agree on a common set of poli-
cies, NAFO's structure may make the enforcement of these policies
and the prosecution of violators very difficult.
The Fish Stocks Agreement is a laudable attempt at reforming
current fishery law dealing with straddling and migratory fish stocks,
and it contains some groundbreaking provisions. At the same time,
the Fish Stocks Agreement fails to adequately address at least two
serious structural problems which contributed to the 1995 Canada-EU
dispute. First, although the Fish Stocks Agreement relies heavily on
regional fishery organizations to formulate and enforce various rules
and regulations, it inadequately addresses the voluntary compliance
structures of organizations like NAFO. This failure gives rise to seri-
ous ambiguities which may impede the Fish Stocks Agreement's abil-
ity to address some of the main deficiencies in both UNCLOS IIn and
NAFO which contributed to the 1995 Canada-EU dispute. Second, by
entrusting the flag state with the primary responsibility of prosecuting
and sanctioning violations of regional fishery rules, the Fish Stocks
Agreement may fail to adequately address problems of underenforce-
ment which have plagued NAFO in the past. Thus, it appears that the
Fish Stock Agreement's success in regulating and preserving strad-
dling and migratory fish stocks will depend to a large extent on the
willingness of states fishing for a particular straddling or migratory
resource to agree on common measures and quotas and to enforce
those measures and quotas against their own vessels.
As the 1995 Canada-EU fishing dispute demonstrates, states have
not always been willing to agree on common consevation measures,
and they have not always been willing to prosecute and sanction their
own vessels for violating regional rules. To the extent that the Fish
Stocks Agreement relies on the willingness of states to agree on com-
mon measures and to enforce regional rules on their own, it fails to
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adequately address two of the main deficiencies in the existing system
of international fishery law which contributed to the 1995 Canada-EU
dispute. Thus, it appears that unless regional fisheries organizations
like NAFO have the authority to force their members to reach bind-
ing and enforceable agreements and unless enforcement and sanction-
ing authority is placed in some independent tribunal or party, it is
unlikely that the Fish Stocks Agreement will fully achieve its goals of
promoting the rational and peaceful harvesting of the oceans' strad-
dling and migratory fish stocks.
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